What are the key lessons from launching Britain’s @NatInfraCom?
Share article@NatInfraCom has survived because it complements the work done by existing departments
Share articleOnly by engaging with communities will Britain become more open to big projects
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There is a consensus that the UK needs more and better infrastructure. There is not, however, agreement on what that infrastructure should be or how to deliver it.
To address this strategic challenge, then chancellor George Osborne launched Britain's first National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) in October 2015 and appointed former secretary of state Lord Andrew Adonis as its chair. I was his chief of staff.
Nearly two years into its short life, the NIC has already published reports on (but not limited to): Crossrail 2, a new underground line for London; improved roads in the north of England; flexible, green energy grids to keep the lights on once existing power plants reach the end of their cycle; and the future of digital telecoms.
Here are five reflections on building the infrastructure behind infrastructure: where the NIC went right and wrong, and what that means for structuring government in Britain and beyond.
The NIC is an independent, strategic advisory body. Eight commissioners, supported by 40 civil servants, provide the government with impartial, expert advice through published reports and public statements. As an arms-length body, it can do two things that a government department cannot.
First, it can say politically contentious things, which gives ministers cover to make difficult decisions. For example, in its report on connectivity in the north of England, the Commission explicitly identified those transport corridors that are most in need of expansion (versus those that are not), which allowed the government to prioritise their limited funds.
Second, it can act surgically and strategically. Established government departments are focused on the day-to-day, all-consuming operational functions of government. They have neither the time nor the perspective to step back, look at the big picture, identify needs, and propose solutions. The NIC's work on digital connectivity is a case in point: whilst the regulator focused on the market for 5G, the NIC pointed out that ensuring broad 4G coverage should be the priority.
Ministers like to create new organisations, yet they are often short-lived. Territorial scraps with pre-existing departments are not only a waste of time and money but a sure-fire way for the new body to fall short of its ambitious mission. Many are ultimately scrapped. In time, Department for Exiting the EU must learn to get on with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to avoid going the same way.
The NIC has survived because it complements, rather than cannibalises, the work done by existing departments like the Treasury, the Department for Transport, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, and others. Before the NIC's creation, the spending departments (who use public funds) complained that they could not get a read from the Treasury (the department that allocates public funds) about infrastructure priorities, and the Treasury complained that spending departments only ever promoted their own pet projects.
With its commitment to building cross-departmental networks, the NIC has helped to overcome this problem.
Lord Michael Heseltine, former deputy prime minister and one of the NIC's first commissioners, likes to say that the British civil service is the Rolls-Royce of government administration. He is right, but sometimes change requires a Ferrari.
With roots dating back to 1855, our civil servants are the elite in administration, operations, and procedure. Universally dedicated and - in modern times - almost entirely meritocratic, they are excellent at what they do.
Yet in these times of technological and political disruption, we also need civil servants who can think more like Richard Branson and less like Sir Humphrey (the archetypal civil servant depicted in the BBC comedy Yes, Minister).
Some of our civil servants thrived in the new, freer environment. In the future, such individuals should be welcomed and harnessed, buttressed by frequent intakes into the pyramid from the private and non-profit sectors.
Early after our launch, we described ourselves as a “non-political” infrastructure body. We dropped this label quickly, on realising that good policy does and must take politics into account.
That is not politics in the sense of left versus right but in the sense of reflecting the will of normal people. Infrastructure is, in this sense, intensely political: roads and railways physically cut through communities, and only by engaging with those communities will Britain become more open to big projects.
In part, this is why High Speed 2 has been low-speed in its rollout and why the London Bridge station upgrades have rightly stirred outrage from delayed commuters.
France, Germany and Switzerland are much better at public consultation. Leveraging their more federalised government structures, everyone from local councillors upwards consults their constituents both in person and online. Constituents' fears about disruption are mollified, and they are educated about a project's benefits.
This sort of outreach should be included in the NIC's remit as it seeks to build not just railways and roads but a culture of infrastructure investment in Britain.
On 22 June 2016, the Treasury had just one Brexit team in one temporary office. Today, the majority of Whitehall is, in one way or another, dealing with Brexit and its fallout.
Britain's decision to leave the EU upended the NIC just as it did all other public bodies. Existing infrastructure collaborations between the UK and the EU were suddenly unsteady, and private financiers became concerned. Future collaborations looked uncertain. Insufficient thought had been given to questions like what would happen to future European Investment Bank funding.
There are two clear lessons. The first is to look out to the horizon and prepare for all eventualities, sun or storm. Even though the referendum result was unexpected, it was clearly a possibility, and all branches of government should have been more prepared.
The second lesson is to know when to change course and, more importantly, when to hold steady. Britain still needs significant infrastructure improvements. Indeed, with uncertainty around future trading partnerships, repairing the literal foundations of our economy has never been more important.
Beyond Britain, other countries can learn from these reflections.
According to the World Economic Forum, global annual spending on basic infrastructure should be US$3.7 trillion whereas it currently amounts to just US$2.7 trillion. In the US, 32% of the country's roads are rated as “poor”, up from 16% in 2005. Recent elections in France, South Korea and other wealthy countries have all seen winning candidates pledging infrastructure revolutions.
To get the job done, they would do well to look at the NIC. After all, much of good policymaking is R&D: rob and duplicate.
